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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3299
___________
DIRECTV, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
V.
JOSEPH JARVIS,
                                              Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00055)
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
_________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 22, 2008
Before:    MCKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  January 30, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Joseph Jarvis appeals from the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey’s December 14, 2006 order granting DIRECTV, Inc.’s (“DIRECTV”)
motion for summary judgment as well as the July 9, 2007 order denying Jarvis’s motion
for reconsideration.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that we do not have
     Jarvis was represented by counsel until the District Court’s June 27, 2006 order1
allowing his attorney to withdraw.  The June 27 order stated that Jarvis would be
proceeding pro se. 
2
jurisdiction to review the December 14, 2006 order and that we will affirm the July 9,
2007 order.  
I.
In May 2003, DIRECTV filed a complaint against Jarvis and several other
individuals alleging that the defendants violated numerous federal statutes by purchasing
and using illegal devices to unlawfully intercept and receive its satellite television
programming.  (See D.N.J. Civ. No. 03-cv-2423.)  As the litigation proceeded, DIRECTV
served discovery on the defendants.  Jarvis apparently complied (at least in part) with his
discovery obligations by responding to DIRECTV’s requests for admissions. 
 In December 2003, the District Court severed the matter against Jarvis, and
DIRECTV refiled its complaint against him in January 2004.  (See D.N.J. Civ. No. 04-cv-
00055.)  Given that the severed case was a distinct action, the Magistrate Judge ordered
the parties to reserve written discovery.  Therefore, on October 28, 2005, DIRECTV
served Jarvis’s counsel  with a new set of discovery requests, which included requests for1
admissions.  Despite repeated letters from DIRECTV’s counsel and an order by the
Magistrate Judge to respond to the overdue discovery requests by April 17, 2006, Jarvis
failed to respond to the request for admissions until at least June 14, 2006—two weeks
     Jarvis filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment decision on January 17,2
2007.  He withdrew the appeal after the Clerk of this Court notified him that it was
subject to dismissal for untimeliness. 
3
after DIRECTV filed its summary judgment motion.  
In an order entered December 14, 2006, the District Court granted DIRECTV’s
motion for summary judgment and denied Jarvis’s cross-motion.  Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) provides that “a matter is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after
service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. . . the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a
written answer or objection. . . .”   Because Jarvis did not answer the 2005 requests for
admissions within 30 days of service or within the time ordered by the Magistrate Judge,
the District Court deemed Jarvis to have admitted every one of DIRECTV’s requests for
admissions.  The District Court then held that the admissions, in addition to the papers
submitted by the parties and certain internet postings by Jarvis, led it to determine that
there were no material facts in dispute.  It thus ordered summary judgment in favor of
DIRECTV.  See Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168,
176 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990) (“This Court and others have held that ‘deemed admissions’ under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a) are sufficient to support orders of summary judgment.”).
 Twenty-one days after entry of summary judgment, Jarvis filed a motion to 
enlarge his time to file a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.   On2
January 17, 2007, Jarvis moved the District Court to reconsider the denial of his motion
4for enlargement.  The District Court apparently considered the motion as a second request
for an enlargement of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment
order.  And on February 2, 2007, the District Court granted the motion and allowed Jarvis
10 days to file a motion for reconsideration “provided that” he include new evidence to
support his assertion that he had responded to the 2005 requests for admissions.  
Jarvis’s motion for reconsideration did not, however, include any new evidence. 
Rather, through his exhibits, he appeared to argue that his responses to the 2003 requests
for admissions should count as answers to the 2005 requests for admissions.  Jarvis also
contended that the District Court should not have applied Rule 36(a) because he
eventually answered the 2005 requests for admissions—albeit nearly eight months after
they were served, two months after the Magistrate Judge’s deadline, and two weeks after
DIRECTV filed its summary judgment motion.
On July 9, 2007, the District Court denied Jarvis’s motion for reconsideration.  The
District Court determined that instead of presenting new evidence, the motion merely
demonstrated Jarvis’s disagreement with the summary judgment decision.  
On July 30, 2007, Jarvis filed a pro se notice of appeal as to the District Court’s
December 14, 2006 and July 9, 2007 decisions.                               
II.
We first address the issue of our jurisdiction.  Subject to certain exceptions, a
notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days from the disputed order’s entry date.  Fed.
5R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Jarvis’s July 30, 2007 notice of appeal was thus untimely filed as
to the District Court’s December 14, 2006 order.  Id.   Although a motion for
reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60 will toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal if it is filed within 10 days of entry of the order, see Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(4)(A), Jarvis did not even file his motion for an enlargement of time to file a
motion for reconsideration until 21 days after the District Court’s summary judgment
order.  Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s December 14, 2006
order.  
We do, however, have authority to review the July 9, 2007 order denying Jarvis’s
motion for reconsideration.  Although Jarvis did not specify whether his motion was
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b), we believe that, read
liberally, the motion may be construed as one filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).   See
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that when a motion is
“filed outside of the ten days provided for under Rule 59(e) but within the year permitted
under Rule 60(b), and the motion may be read to include grounds cognizable under the
latter rule, we will consider it to have been filed as a Rule 60(b) motion”).  See also Helm
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1995).  We review the District
Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  Reform Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny
County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (“An abuse of discretion
may be found when the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of
     We note that an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion places at issue only3
the denial of the motion for review, not the merits of the underlying decision.  Smith v.
Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988).
6
fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” (internal
citation omitted)).  3
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jarvis’s motion for
reconsideration.  Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is “extraordinary relief and may only be
invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances,” Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood,
280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002), and this case does not present any exceptional
circumstances.  In the motion, Jarvis asserted that he had responded to DIRECTV’s
requests for admissions and thus that the requests should not have been deemed admitted. 
In support of this assertion, Jarvis attached: (1) his responses to the 2003 requests for
admissions, and (2) his responses to the 2005 requests for admissions that he submitted to
DIRECTV two weeks after its summary judgment motion and two months after the
Magistrate Judge’s deadline.  This was not new evidence.  The District Court had these
pieces of information when it decided the summary judgment motions, and Jarvis’s
motion for reconsideration merely spells out his disagreement with the District Court’s
application of Rule 36(a).  This is not an appropriate basis for reopening a judgment, and
the District Court properly denied Jarvis’s motion.  See Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of
Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 901, 911 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is improper to grant relief under
     To the extent that Jarvis’s sought reconsideration based on his argument that4
DIRECTV violated the statute of limitation or did not provide sufficient evidence to
succeed on summary judgment, these are issues that should have been brought in an
appeal.  See Martinez-McBean, 562 F.2d at 911.
Rule 60(b)(6) if the aggrieved party could have reasonably sought the same relief by
means of appeal.”).   Moreover, neither Jarvis’s responses to the 2003 requests for4
admissions nor his untimely responses to the 2005 requests for admissions would have
required the District Court to change its decision deeming the 2005 requests admitted. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order entered on July
9, 2007.
